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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant David Knott was charged by citation with Driving under the Influence 
on August 14, 2010, in violation of I.C. § 18-8004, after refusing to take a breath test in 
violation ofI.C. §18-8002. Mr. Knott successfully challenged the refusal which was 
dismissed on the basis that the advisory form was ambiguous as to Mr. Knott, who was an 
out-of-state licensed driver. See Clerk's Record on Appeal, hereafter "R," p. 24 [October 
20,2010 Order in CV-2010-6541.] 
On April 15, 2011, Mr. Knott filed a motion in the criminal case to exclude 
evidence of the refusal in the State's case-in-chief on the grounds that 1) a proper 
advisement is a necessary foundational element for introduction of the refusal; 2) without 
a proper advisement, the evidence of the refusal denies Mr. Knott's rights under the Fifth 
Amendment; 3) the introduction denies Mr. Knott his fundamental right to due process of 
law under the federal and state constitutions; and 4) I.R.E. 403 prohibited use of the 
refusal as it is more prejudicial than probative given the improper advisement. R p. 35. 
After argument on the motion, the Magistrate Court denied the motion in a written 
opinion filed on April 29, 2011. Rp.49. 
IThe Magistrate Court relied on the District Court decision in State v. Kling, Blaine 
County case No. CV-2007-1034, which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 
State v. Kling (In re Kling), 150 Idaho 188,245 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2010). 
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Mr. Knott filed a motion for reconsideration [R p. 58] which was denied on May 5, 
2011 [R p. 70], after further argument and receipt of additional evidence. 
On June 21, 2011, Mr. Knott entered a conditional plea of guilty to the driving 
under the influence charge, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
exclude evidence of the refusal [R p. 76], and thereafter appealed to the District Court. R 
p. 80. The District Court affinned the Magistrate decision on May 17,2012. Rp. 142. 
Mr. Knott thereafter filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court on June 15, 
2012. R p. 144. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Knott, a resident of New York state, was driving his vehicle in the Sun Valley 
area on August 14,2010. Police stopped and eventually arrested Mr. Knot for driving 
under the influence. The circumstances of the arrest are not at issue in this appeal. 
The arresting officer took Mr. Knott to the Sun Valley Police Department where he 
played an audio-taped advisory regarding alcohol testing for Mr. Knott and gave him a 
copy of the fonn to review. After the playing of the tape, the officer told Mr. Knott, "you 
can either take the test or you can refuse. It is completely up to you." R p. 148, 5/4111 
Exhibits A-B. Mr. Knott stated that he was "not sure of the consequences" of refusing 
the test. The officer told Mr. Knott there would be a $250 fine and the loss of his "Idaho 
Driver's license." Ibid. Later, still not understanding, Mr. Knott again asked about what 
would happen ifhe refused the breath test, saying he did not have an Idaho driver's 
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license. Ibid. Mr. Knott subsequently politely refused the breath test, and was cited for 
Driving Under the Influence. The officer then drove Mr. Knott back to where he was 
staying in Sun Valley. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the State in its case-in-chief can present evidence that an out-of-state 
licensed driver refused the evidentiary test despite a court ruling that the officer 
improperly advised him of the consequences of a refusal. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review 
When an appellate court is reviewing a district court decision, acting in its 
appellate capacity, this Court reviews the record and the magistrate's decision 
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision. Doe v. State, l37 
Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,343 (2002) (quoting Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 
498,817 P.2d 160,164 (1991)). 
A court of appeal exercises free review over questions of law. See, e.g. Fields v. 
State, 149 Idaho 399,400,234 P.3d 723, 724-25 (2010); Allied Bail Bonds v. County of 
Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409, 259 P.3d 340,344 (2011). Questions regarding the 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed using a mixed standard. First, whether the 
evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review. State v. Stevens, 146 
Idaho l39, 143,191 P.3d 217,221 (2008), citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,569,165 
3 
P.3d 273, 283 (2007). However, the lower court's determination of whether the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143. 
Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion is determined by examining the 
following: (1) did the court correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; (2) did the 
court act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the 
applicable legal standards; and (3) did the court reach its decision by an exercise of 
reason? State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582,590 (2010). 
2. The Evidence of the Refusal Should Have Been Excluded 
Mr. Knott submits that a defendant must be properly notified of the consequences 
relating to refusing evidentiary testing before that refusal may be used against a defendant 
in the underlying criminal DUI case. While the Idaho Supreme Court has held generally 
that a refusal to take an alcohol test may be admissible at a criminal trial, the Idaho 
appellate courts have not set forth clear rules on the foundational requirements for the 
admission of such evidence. See, State v. Brock, 80 Idaho 296,328 P.2d 1065 (1958).2 
A. Relevance and Foundational Requirements 
Mr. Knott argued below that holding and reasoning in State v. Salts, Blaine County 
Case CR-2003-15090, was applicable in this case, and that the foundational requirements 
2 Brock was decided under a statutory scheme where a driver had a clear right to 
refuse the test and the police were prohibited from taking a test after a refusal. See, I.C. 
§ 49-352 in effect in 1955, subsequently repealed and replaced by I.C. § 18-8002. 
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for the admission of refusal evidence include proper advisement of the consequences set 
forth by the statute. In Salts the court first held that "the improper notification by 
Marshall Tremble of the rights possessed by Ms. Salts pursuant to § 18-8002 bars the 
admissibility of her refusal to submit to evidentiary testing and that any subjective 
interpretation of Ms. Salts' thoughts would not be productive." R p. 44 [Exhibit A to 
Knott's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine.] In essence, holding that the 
evidence was now not relevant, or "productive." The opinion also excluded the evidence 
on the basis that the State's burden of admitting refusal evidence in criminal cases should 
be "at least as high" as in the civil proceedings. R p. 45. Finally, the opinion held that 
the evidence was more prejudicial than probative precisely because of the mis-
information provided by the arresting officer. R p. 46. 
Both the magistrate and district court rejected the Salts reasoning, adopting the 
view that a defendant's refusal is admissible regardless of the sufficiency of the advisory. 
The magistrate rejected the idea that any foundational requirements are necessary for the 
admission of the refusal evidence, holding that the consequences of the refusal "have 
nothing to do with the criminal consequences of the same refusal." R p. 70. See also 
April 25, 2011 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal from Magistrate Court, hereafter "Tr. I," 
pp. 18-19. The district court stated that it was "reversing" its earlier decision in Salts, 
concluding the sufficiency of the advisory and its impact on the defendant's refusal was a 
5 
question for the jury. May 9, 2012 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal from District Court, 
hereafter "Tr. I," p. 40-45. 
The opinion in State v. Salts, however, retains its validity and should be followed 
by this Court.3 The relevance and probative value of a defendant's refusal to submit to an 
evidentiary test is tied to the issue of guilt solely because it creates an inference that the 
defendant is trying to hide evidence. However, this "consciousness of guilt" inference 
cannot be sustained where the improper advice "eliminate[ d]" the defendant's knowingly, 
willful and voluntary refusal to take a breath test. R p. 45. In other words, the refusal 
evidence loses its probative value when it is the product of the improper advice. While 
not controlling precedent, the Salts reasoning should be followed by this Court; refusal 
evidence should be barred where an improper advisory undermines the relevance of that 
evidence to the extent that its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential 
for unfair prejudice. 
Cases from other jurisdictions, and cited in the trial court by Mr. Knott, support 
this conclusion. 
stated: 
In Longley v. State of Alaska, 776 P.2d 339,344 (Alaska App. 1989), the court 
Longley's initial refusal to submit to the intoximeter test is not 
admissible under the terms of AS 28.35.032 because Longley had not yet 
3The decision in Salts was affinned on appeal by the District Court. 
6 
been advised that his refusal could be used as evidence against him, as 
required by subsection(a) of the statute. A showing that the warnings 
required by the implied consent statute were given is necessary to establish 
a foundation for the admission of evidence of a refusal. ... 
The court held that the warning requirement was intended to assure an infonned 
choice on the part of the motorist, and that it would be unfair to attach to the refusal a 
consequence of which the driver had not been notified. Ibid. 
In contrast, in State v. Forney, 659 P.2d 929 (Oregon App. 1985), when proper 
warnings were provided, the refusal was admissible. 
stated: 
Without some evidence that the defendant was not given the 
appropriate statutory warnings or did not understand what his refusal would 
mean - - and there is no suggestion of either sort of infinnity in this case - -
defendant did refuse to take the test, and the State was entitled to use 
evidence of it. 
Similarly, in Moore v. State 458 S.E.2d 479,480 (Georgia App. 1995), the court 
A defendant's refusal to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, 
urine, or other bodily substances at the time of his arrest is admissible in 
evidence against him in a criminal trial. However, a defendant must 
knowingly, willfully and voluntarily refuse to submit to a State-
administered test before such refusal is admissible. A criminal defendant is 
not required to submit to a State-administered test if he has not been 
properly informed of his implied consent rights. Under such circumstances, 
the refusal is justified, and any evidence of the refusal is inadmissible. 
In State v. Miceli, 554 N.W.2d 427,431 (Nebraska App. 1996), where evidence of 
the defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical breath test went to the jury, despite the 
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fact that the defendant was not properly informed of all the consequences of refusing or 
of taking and failing a chemical breath test, the Court of Appeal noted that the 
Supreme Court held that a license revocation based upon an attempted 
advisement by a form identical to the form used in this case constituted 
plain error. . . . . This court recently held under Smith and its progeny that 
such evidence should not have gone before the jury and that the fact it did 
reach the jury was prejudicial and constituted plain error which required a 
reversal of a DUI conviction and remand for a new trial. 
And in Janak v. State a/Texas, 826 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Texas App. 1992), the court stated: 
Janak also asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Officer 
Farmer to testifY, over objection, that Janak refused to take a blood test. 
Janak contends that evidence of a statutory warning, as required by 
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 67011-5 is a predicate for admission of this 
evidence, and since no evidence of the warning was offered, the refusal 
evidence should not have been admitted. We agree. As the refusal to take a 
blood test is in the nature of an incriminating act or statement, evidence of it 
is not admissible unless the statutory warning was given. Evidence that the 
warning was given is a necessary predicate to the refusal's admissibility. 
There was no scientific evidence of Janak's intoxication. The only 
evidence of it was from Officer Farmer, who testified about his conclusions 
based on Janak's condition and actions. Evidence that Janak refused to take 
a blood test was thus, in those circumstances, harmful. 
The magistrate court sought to distinguish these cases. The court disregarded 
Longley v. State, 776 P.2d 339 (Alaska App. 1989) by asserting that it relied entirely on 
the application of a specific statute for its ruling, but this was incorrect. While it is true 
that the Longley court held that the statute had not been complied with because the refusal 
was discussed before the defendant had been arrested, the court went on to hold that the 
refusal could not be admitted under prior case law because the mis-advice adversely 
affected the person's informed choice. 
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Without the warnings, a refusal to submit to an Intoximeter test may 
not come in under AS 28.35.032(e). A case such as this one is controlled 
by the cases decided prior to the 1980 amendment to AS 28.35.032, which 
added subsection (e) and the requirement of a warning that a refusal may be 
used against the person. In Puller v. Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285 (Alaska 
1978), the supreme court held that a refusal to take a breathalyzer test was 
inadmissible because the warnings given under AS 28.35.032 at that time 
did not include a warning that a refusal could be used as evidence against 
the driver. The court held that the warning requirement was intended to 
assure an informed choice on the part of the motorist, and that it would be 
unfair to attach to the refusal a consequence of which the driver had not 
been notified. Puller, 574 P.2d at 1288. See also Wirz v. State, 577 P.2d 
227 (Alaska 1978) (if an arrestee refuses to take the test, he must be advised 
of the consequences flowing from his refusal, and be permitted to 
reconsider his refusal in light of that information). Longley's refusal to take 
the test was not an informed choice. He had not yet been warned of any of 
the possible consequences of refusing, and as soon as he received those 
warnings, he agreed to submit to the test. Under these circumstances his 
refusal should not have been admitted. 
Id. at p. 345 [emphasis added]. 
The magistrate court discounted Forney as dicta. R p. 55. While the language 
from that case may be dicta, it stands for the proposition that appropriate warnings should 
be given in order to admit the refusal evidence. Thus, while there was no such evidence 
presented in Forney, the failure to provide adequate warnings has been conceded here. 
The magistrate court rejected Moore v. State, 458 S.E.2d 479 (Georgia App. 1993) 
solely because of a "right to refuse" in Georgia which is not "relevant" in Idaho. R p. 55. 
Yet, the critical holding in Moore and the cases it relies upon is the premise that the 
defendant must make an informed choice under the implied consent laws. Thus in 
"[a]pplying an objective standard, we conclude that, in view of the state of the evidence 
9 
and the findings of fact by the trial court supported thereby, appellee was deprived by the 
totality of the inaccurate, misleading, and/or inapplicable information given to him by the 
arresting officer of making an informed choice under the implied consent statute, and 
accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that appellee's refusal to consent to 
the urine test was rendered inadmissible." State v. Leviner, 443 S.E.2d 688,691 (Georgia 
App. 1994). 
Next, the magistrate court found that State v. Miceli, 554 N.W.2d 417 (Nebraska 
App. 1996) turned on the specifics of the advisement which had been changed by statute, 
thereby making the case irrelevant here. However, the premise of that case remains-
when a person has been misinformed of the consequences of the refusal, that refusal 
cannot be admitted at trial. Finally, the statutory language referred to in Janak v. State, 
826 S.W.2d 803 (Texas App. 1992) was not repealed, as the magistrate concludes, but 
merely was replaced by another similar statute in 1995. See, Tex. Trans. Code § 
724.015.4 
Thus, these out-of-state cases should be considered as persuasive precedent on the 
issue before this Court. They all stand for the proposition that refusal evidence tainted by 
improper advice from the police loses its relevance at a criminal trial on the issue of the 
4In fact, many of these states have statutes which state that evidence of the refusal 
is admissible in a criminal trial. See, e.g. Tex. Trans. Code § 724.061, Alaska Stat. § 
28.35.032(e). In contrast, the Idaho Legislature has not enacted such a law, leaving it to 
the judiciary to establish the conditions under which a refusal should be admitted in a 
criminal trial. 
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driver's consciousness of guilt, the sole basis for admission of the evidence. Therefore, 
Mr. Knott's motion in limine should have been granted, and the magistrate court decision 
should be reversed on these grounds. 
The magistrate court further erred in its Rule 403 analysis. In reviewing a decision 
under Rules of Evidence, Rule 403, this Court must apply an abuse-of-discretion standard 
of review. Here, there is no indication in the ruling that it viewed this issue as one where 
discretion was to be applied. The court extensively addressed the issue that there was no 
right to refuse, and therefore evidence of the refusal was required to be admitted in all 
circumstances in Idaho law. In contrast, the court considered the weighing issue in two 
short sentences: "The fact that the Defendant refused a test is probative of his 
consciousness of gUilt. Improper warnings about the consequences of refusal in a 
separate civil proceeding do not make that evidence so prejudicial that admission of it is 
prohibited." R p. 56 (emphasis added). 
Thus, by applying an incorrect legal standard the trial court abused its discretion, 
and its ruling should have been reversed by the district court. The magistrate court did 
not engage in a full analysis of the factors under Rule 403, which states, "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." 
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In this case, the admission of the refusal evidence would result not only in 
prejudice to Mr. Knott, but confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury and waste of 
time. While the magistrate court did not address the issue of how the jury would be 
informed of or instructed on the erroneous information provided to Mr. Knott, given the 
importance of the refusal evidence to the State's case, much of the trial would consist of 
evidence on the issue of why Mr. Knott refused the test and not whether he was under the 
influence when he drove the car. Because much of the trial would hinge on the 
"subjective interpretation" of Mr. Knott's thoughts when he refused the test after the 
improper advice from the officer, the evidence should have been excluded under a 
complete and proper Rule 403 analysis.5 
B. The Cases Relied upon by the Lower Courts Are Not Controlling 
It is uncontested that Mr. Knott was improperly advised about the consequences of 
his refusal. However, in affirming the magistrate decision allowing the State to introduce 
evidence ofMr. Knott's refusal of the breath test, the District Court relied on State v. 
Decker, 152 Idaho 142,267 P.3d 729 (Ct. App. 2011), and the cases cited therein,6 to 
5Mr. Knott sought exclusion of this evidence only in the State's case-in-chief, but 
conceded throughout that the State might be able to introduce this evidence as rebuttal or 
in cross-examination should the door be opened in the defendant's case. The exclusion of 
this evidence during the State's case is the proper remedy for the failure to provide proper 
advice to Mr. Knott before his refusal. 
6See, State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 373, 775 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1989); State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Harmon, 131 
Idaho 80, 85,952 P.2d 402,407 (Ct. App. 1998) 
12 
hold that the "refusal of evidentiary tests are (sic) admissible at trial even if the officer 
failed to notify the defendant or notify the defendant properly of the consequences of the 
refusal." Tr II p. 40. The Court noted that there was no right to refuse a breath test in 
Idaho? and stated, 
[A]dmissibility, ... shifts to a relevance analysis, and [a] failure to 
comport with 18-8002A does not implicate the procedure in the criminal 
case because 18-8002A and 18-8002 are devoted entirely to the 
administrative or civil suspension of the license of the driver. ... 
The defendant would appear to be free to argue that the reason he 
refused is because he thought his out-of-state license would not be taken 
based on the improper representations of the officer. And I think at the trial 
court level the defendant can ask for instructions to the jury on the state of 
the law, ... 
Tr II p. 42-44. 
The cases relied upon by the magistrate and district court do not address the issue 
raised in this appeal and are not controlling. First, all involve situations where the State 
sought to introduce evidence of breath test results, not the evidence of the refusal. State 
v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, supra [blood test results] (2011), State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 
368, supra, [blood]; State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, supra, [breath]; and State v. DeWitt, 
145 Idaho 709, supra, [blood]. Thus, these cases would be controlling only if the officer 
?The magistrate court similarly held that because Mr. Knott had no "right to 
refuse," evidence of his refusal was admissible despite the improper and misleading 
advice provided to him by the arresting officer. See R p. 49. 
13 
had administered a blood test after Mr. Knott had chosen to refuse the breath test. But, 
that is not the factual situation here. 
Second, these cases all involve the "implied consent" statute which permits the 
police to obtain evidence of a person's blood alcohol level even if no warnings are 
provided or even if the person is unconscious. These statutes are rooted in the notion that 
driving is a privilege and that a person has given implicit consent to the search by using a 
motor vehicle on the roads of the state. Because the implied consent statute has no direct 
bearing on the question presented in this case - the relevance and prejudicial effect, and 
therefore the admissibility of a refusal, where the officer gave improper advice about the 
consequences of the refusal- the holdings of these cases do not control here. 
Third, the officer in this case told Mr. Knott that he had a choice, and in fact the 
officer honored that choice by not obtaining an alcohol test from Mr. Knott. Thus, 
regardless of whether he had a "legal" right to refuse, the officer's specific statement that 
Mr. Knott had that choice without explaining all of the consequences of that choice -
controls in this situation. Because an innocent driver would reasonably elect not to take 
the test under these circumstances, the inference of guilt which makes the refusal 
evidence relevant to the issues to be decided by the jury, the State should not be able to 
introduce this evidence in light of the officer's misinformation. 
Indeed, the court of appeals has noted: "Also, the out-of-state driver may well not 
understand what impact, if any, the limitation that the license is valid in Idaho for only 
14 
thirty days has on its validity outside of Idaho, including in the issuing state. Under these 
circumstances, an out-of-state driver who does not plan to remain in this State may be 
substantially more likely than the in-state counterpart to refuse evidentiary testing." State 
v. Kling, 150 Idaho at 193.8 Because the improper advice in this case the likelihood of the 
driver refusing the test, the State should not be permitted to now use this wrongfully 
induced refusal against Mr. Knott. 
None of the cases relied upon by the magistrate court confront the issues raised by 
the court in Salts. As set forth above, the cases relied upon by the magistrate were cases 
where the alcohol tests had been taken and did not address the admission of the refusal 
evidence itself. 
8Indeed, the prosecutor conceded the significance of the improper advisement: 
"And I think some out-of-state people would be led to believe that nothing is going to 
happen to them if they refused. I think that's the worst thing that you could say about the 
ambiguity of the form, not that worse things would happen to them than would be 
possible, but then maybe nothing would happen to them, and that's why they refuse." 




For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the 
decision oflower court, set aside Mr. Knott's conviction, and order that the evidence of 
the refusal be excluded from the State's case-in-chief. 
DATED: December 13,2012, 
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